Your VPN says you're anonymous. Your browser quietly disagrees.
WebRTC leaks occur when your browser exposes your real IP address through the WebRTC API, even while connected to a VPN or proxy. This happens because WebRTC uses STUN servers to discover your network interfaces—and these requests bypass your encrypted tunnel entirely.
In this guide, I'll show you 12 proven methods to prevent WebRTC leaks across every major browser. We'll go beyond basic extension installs and dive into firewall rules, iceTransportPolicy configurations, mDNS candidate manipulation, and enterprise deployment strategies that most guides completely ignore.
What Is a WebRTC Leak?
The main difference between regular IP leaks and WebRTC leaks is that WebRTC operates outside your browser's normal HTTP stack. Standard traffic flows through your VPN tunnel, but WebRTC's STUN requests query external servers directly via UDP—completely bypassing your VPN's protection. This architectural design means even premium VPNs can fail to protect you unless they specifically handle WebRTC traffic.
WebRTC (Web Real-Time Communication) powers video calls, screen sharing, and peer-to-peer file transfers directly in your browser. It works by exchanging IP addresses between peers to establish connections.
The problem? Any website can trigger this IP discovery process using JavaScript.
Here's how the leak happens under the hood:
// Websites use code like this to discover your IPs
const pc = new RTCPeerConnection({
iceServers: [{ urls: 'stun:stun.l.google.com:19302' }]
});
pc.createDataChannel('');
pc.createOffer().then(offer => pc.setLocalDescription(offer));
pc.onicecandidate = (event) => {
if (event.candidate) {
// Each candidate contains an IP address
console.log(event.candidate.candidate);
}
};
This code creates a peer connection and gathers ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) candidates. Each candidate includes your local IP (like 192.168.1.x), your public IP, and potentially both your VPN IP and your real ISP-assigned IP simultaneously.
The browser doesn't ask permission. The user sees nothing. Your real location gets exposed silently.
Two Types of WebRTC Leaks You Need to Know
Understanding leak severity helps you prioritize fixes.
Persistent vanilla leaks expose your IP the moment a page loads—no camera or microphone permission required. Any malicious script can harvest your real IP address. This is the severe type.
Permission-based leaks only occur after you grant a site access to your camera or microphone. Still problematic for privacy, but requires user interaction first.
Most browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Opera, Brave) suffer from persistent leaks by default. Safari offers slightly better protection by requiring permissions before exposing IPs.
Test If You're Leaking Right Now
Before implementing fixes, confirm whether you're vulnerable.
- Note your real IP address at any IP checker site (without VPN)
- Connect to your VPN and verify your IP changed
- Visit browserleaks.com/webrtc or ipleak.net
- Check the WebRTC detection section
If you see your original ISP-assigned IP alongside (or instead of) your VPN's IP, you're leaking.
Here's a more comprehensive leak detection script you can run in your browser console:
async function detectWebRTCLeak() {
const discoveredIPs = new Set();
const config = {
iceServers: [
{ urls: 'stun:stun.l.google.com:19302' },
{ urls: 'stun:stun1.l.google.com:19302' },
{ urls: 'stun:stun2.l.google.com:19302' }
]
};
const pc = new RTCPeerConnection(config);
pc.createDataChannel('leak-detection');
const offer = await pc.createOffer();
await pc.setLocalDescription(offer);
return new Promise((resolve) => {
pc.onicecandidate = (event) => {
if (!event.candidate) {
pc.close();
resolve(Array.from(discoveredIPs));
return;
}
const candidate = event.candidate.candidate;
// Extract IPv4 addresses
const ipv4Match = candidate.match(/(\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}/);
if (ipv4Match) {
discoveredIPs.add(ipv4Match[0]);
}
// Extract IPv6 addresses
const ipv6Match = candidate.match(/([a-f0-9:]+:+)+[a-f0-9]+/i);
if (ipv6Match) {
discoveredIPs.add(ipv6Match[0]);
}
};
// Timeout after 5 seconds
setTimeout(() => {
pc.close();
resolve(Array.from(discoveredIPs));
}, 5000);
});
}
// Run the detection
detectWebRTCLeak().then(ips => {
console.log('Discovered IPs:');
ips.forEach(ip => {
const isPrivate = /^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)/.test(ip);
console.log(`${ip} - ${isPrivate ? 'Private (safe)' : 'PUBLIC (potential leak)'}`);
});
});
Run this with your VPN connected. If any public IP doesn't match your VPN server's IP, you're leaking.
Method 1: Firefox—The Nuclear Option
Firefox offers the most control over WebRTC. You can disable it completely at the protocol level.
Complete WebRTC Disable:
- Type
about:configin the address bar - Accept the risk warning
- Search for
media.peerconnection.enabled - Double-click to set it to
false
WebRTC is now completely dead. Video calls on Google Meet, Discord, Zoom web client—all broken.
The Balanced Approach (Recommended):
Instead of killing WebRTC entirely, configure these settings in about:config:
media.peerconnection.ice.default_address_only = true
media.peerconnection.ice.no_host = true
media.peerconnection.ice.proxy_only_if_behind_proxy = true
media.peerconnection.ice.relay_only = false
The first two settings prevent WebRTC from enumerating all your network interfaces. Websites only see your default public IP—which should be your VPN's IP when connected.
Hidden Firefox Setting Most Guides Miss:
media.peerconnection.ice.obfuscate_host_addresses = true
This setting enables mDNS obfuscation for local IP addresses. Instead of revealing 192.168.1.105, WebRTC reports something like a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890.local. The random UUID changes per session, preventing fingerprinting.
Method 2: Chrome and Chromium Browsers—Extension Required
Chrome lacks built-in WebRTC controls. You need extensions.
WebRTC Leak Prevent Extension:
Install from Chrome Web Store, then open extension options.
For system-level VPN users:
- Select "Use the default public interface only"
For browser extension VPN or proxy users:
- Select "Disable non-proxied UDP"
The extension modifies Chrome's hidden privacy API:
// What the extension does internally
chrome.privacy.network.webRTCIPHandlingPolicy.set({
value: 'disable_non_proxied_udp'
});
This forces all WebRTC traffic through your proxy. No proxy configured? WebRTC stops working.
Hidden Chrome Flag (Limited Effectiveness):
Navigate to chrome://flags and search for:
#enable-webrtc-hide-local-ips-with-mdns
Enable this flag to use mDNS hostnames instead of local IP addresses. This helps with local IP exposure but doesn't prevent public IP leaks.
uBlock Origin Method:
Already running uBlock Origin? Enable its WebRTC protection:
- Open uBlock Origin dashboard
- Go to Settings → Privacy
- Enable "Prevent WebRTC from leaking local IP addresses"
This shims the WebRTC API to intercept and filter ICE candidates before they reach websites.
Method 3: Brave Browser—Built-in Protection
Brave is Chromium-based but includes native WebRTC controls.
Method A: Fingerprinting Protection
- Open Settings → Shields
- Find Fingerprinting blocking
- Set to "Block all fingerprinting"
This aggressively blocks WebRTC communications.
Method B: WebRTC IP Handling Policy
- Go to Settings → Privacy and security
- Find WebRTC IP Handling Policy
- Select "Disable non-proxied UDP"
This option routes WebRTC through your proxy while allowing functionality on sites you trust.
Both methods combined provide the strongest Brave protection. Apply them together for maximum privacy.
Note: Some iOS users report WebRTC still leaking after these changes. Brave is actively patching this issue—keep your browser updated.
Method 4: Safari—Permission-Based Protection
Safari handles WebRTC more securely by default. It won't expose your IP without permission.
However, once you grant camera or microphone access to any site, leak potential exists.
Disable Legacy WebRTC API:
- Safari → Preferences → Advanced
- Enable "Show Develop menu in menu bar"
- Click Develop → Experimental Features
- Uncheck "Enable Legacy WebRTC API"
Disable mDNS ICE Candidates:
In the same Experimental Features menu, uncheck:
WebRTC mDNS ICE candidates
This prevents local IP exposure through mDNS hostname resolution.
iOS Safari Limitation:
Apple removed the WebRTC disable option starting iOS 12. Your only protection is a VPN with explicit WebRTC leak protection—most apps don't route WebRTC traffic through their tunnel by default.
Method 5: Edge—Chromium-Based Configuration
Microsoft Edge uses the Chromium engine. The same extensions work.
Edge Flag (Built-in):
- Navigate to
edge://flags - Search for "Anonymize local IPs exposed by WebRTC"
- Enable the flag
- Restart Edge
Extension Method:
Install WebRTC Leak Prevent from Microsoft Edge Add-ons store. Configure identically to Chrome.
Method 6: Opera—Native WebRTC Controls
Opera includes built-in WebRTC settings.
- Settings → Privacy & Security
- Scroll to WebRTC section
- Select "Disable non-proxied UDP"
This routes WebRTC through your proxy only, blocking leaks for VPN users.
Opera also supports Chrome extensions. Install WebRTC Leak Prevent for additional protection.
Method 7: Vivaldi—Built-in Toggle
Vivaldi includes WebRTC leak protection in its privacy settings.
- Settings → Privacy
- Find WebRTC IP handling
- Untick "Broadcast IP for best WebRTC Performance"
This single toggle blocks most WebRTC leaks without extensions.
Method 8: Tor Browser—Already Protected
Tor Browser disables WebRTC by default. No configuration needed.
If you've manually enabled WebRTC for some reason, disable it immediately—WebRTC leaks completely compromise Tor's anonymity protections.
Method 9: Firewall-Level Protection (Advanced)
Browser settings can be reset by updates or user error. Firewall rules provide a deeper defense layer.
Linux (iptables):
Block outbound STUN traffic on standard ports:
# Block standard STUN port
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 3478 -j DROP
# Block Google's STUN servers
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 19302 -j DROP
# Block alternative STUN ports
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 19303:19309 -j DROP
# Block TURNS (TLS) port
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport 5349 -j DROP
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 5349 -j DROP
Make rules persistent:
# Debian/Ubuntu
sudo apt install iptables-persistent
sudo netfilter-persistent save
# CentOS/RHEL
sudo service iptables save
Windows Firewall:
- Open Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security
- Click Outbound Rules → New Rule
- Select Port → UDP
- Enter specific ports:
3478, 5349, 19302-19309 - Select "Block the connection"
- Apply to all profiles
- Name it "Block WebRTC STUN"
macOS (pf):
Add to /etc/pf.conf:
# Block WebRTC STUN traffic
block out proto udp from any to any port 3478
block out proto udp from any to any port 5349
block out proto udp from any to any port 19302:19309
Enable the firewall:
sudo pfctl -f /etc/pf.conf
sudo pfctl -e
Router-Level Protection:
If your router supports custom firewall rules:
- Block outbound UDP to ports 3478 and 5349
- Apply to all devices on your network
This protects every device without per-browser configuration.
Method 10: Developer Protection—iceTransportPolicy Relay
Building a web application? Force WebRTC to use only relay candidates, preventing direct IP exposure.
const config = {
iceServers: [
{
urls: 'turn:your-turn-server.com:3478',
username: 'user',
credential: 'password'
}
],
iceTransportPolicy: 'relay' // Only use TURN relay candidates
};
const peerConnection = new RTCPeerConnection(config);
With iceTransportPolicy: 'relay', WebRTC only generates relay candidates. Host (local IP) and server-reflexive (public IP) candidates are completely suppressed.
Trade-offs:
- Connections route through your TURN server
- Increased latency compared to direct connections
- TURN server costs (bandwidth-intensive)
- Better privacy for your users
Filter Candidates Server-Side:
If relay-only is too restrictive, filter candidates before sharing:
peerConnection.onicecandidate = (event) => {
if (!event.candidate) return;
const candidate = event.candidate.candidate;
// Only share relay candidates
if (candidate.includes('typ relay')) {
signalingChannel.send({
type: 'candidate',
candidate: event.candidate
});
}
// Drop host and srflx candidates silently
};
Method 11: JavaScript API Shimming
Block WebRTC at the JavaScript level by overwriting the API before malicious scripts execute.
Complete Disable:
(function() {
// Remove all WebRTC constructors
delete window.RTCPeerConnection;
delete window.webkitRTCPeerConnection;
delete window.mozRTCPeerConnection;
delete window.RTCSessionDescription;
delete window.RTCIceCandidate;
// Prevent recreation
Object.defineProperty(window, 'RTCPeerConnection', {
get: function() { return undefined; },
set: function() {}
});
})();
Inject this script before page content loads (using a browser extension or userscript manager).
Selective Blocking (Allow Trusted Sites):
(function() {
const trustedDomains = ['meet.google.com', 'zoom.us', 'discord.com'];
const currentDomain = window.location.hostname;
const isTrusted = trustedDomains.some(domain =>
currentDomain === domain || currentDomain.endsWith('.' + domain)
);
if (!isTrusted) {
const OriginalRTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection;
window.RTCPeerConnection = function(config) {
console.warn('WebRTC blocked on untrusted site:', currentDomain);
throw new Error('WebRTC disabled for privacy');
};
}
})();
STUN Server Whitelist:
Allow WebRTC but only with approved STUN servers:
(function() {
const allowedStunServers = [
'stun:your-company-stun.com',
'turn:your-company-turn.com'
];
const OriginalRTCPeerConnection = window.RTCPeerConnection;
window.RTCPeerConnection = function(config) {
if (config && config.iceServers) {
config.iceServers = config.iceServers.filter(server => {
const urls = Array.isArray(server.urls) ? server.urls : [server.urls];
return urls.some(url =>
allowedStunServers.some(allowed => url.startsWith(allowed))
);
});
// If no approved servers remain, block entirely
if (config.iceServers.length === 0) {
throw new Error('No approved STUN/TURN servers');
}
}
return new OriginalRTCPeerConnection(config);
};
})();
Method 12: Enterprise Deployment
Managing hundreds of browsers? Manual configuration doesn't scale. Use group policies.
Chrome Enterprise Policy (Windows GPO):
{
"WebRtcIPHandlingPolicy": "disable_non_proxied_udp",
"WebRtcLocalIpsAllowedUrls": ["https://meet.company.com"]
}
Deploy via:
- Computer Configuration → Policies → Administrative Templates → Google → Google Chrome → WebRTC
Chrome Enterprise Policy (macOS Profile):
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>WebRtcIPHandlingPolicy</key>
<string>disable_non_proxied_udp</string>
</dict>
</plist>
Firefox Enterprise Policy:
Create /etc/firefox/policies/policies.json:
{
"policies": {
"Preferences": {
"media.peerconnection.enabled": false,
"media.peerconnection.ice.default_address_only": true,
"media.peerconnection.ice.no_host": true
}
}
}
Edge Enterprise Policy:
Same structure as Chrome—Edge accepts Chrome policies for WebRTC settings.
VPN Selection: What Actually Works
Not all VPNs handle WebRTC properly. Many route HTTP traffic through their tunnel but let WebRTC bypass entirely.
VPN Features to Verify:
- Explicit WebRTC leak protection advertised
- Browser extension with WebRTC disable option
- Kill switch that blocks non-VPN traffic (including UDP)
- Tested leak protection (verify yourself after connecting)
VPNs with Verified WebRTC Protection:
NordVPN, ExpressVPN, Surfshark, and ProtonVPN include WebRTC leak protection in their browser extensions. Their desktop apps also handle WebRTC traffic properly.
Always test after connecting. VPN marketing claims don't always match reality.
Mobile Device Protection
Mobile browsers offer limited WebRTC controls.
Android:
Install Firefox and disable WebRTC via about:config (same as desktop). The mobile version supports the same settings.
Chrome on Android has no extension support. Use a VPN app with WebRTC protection.
iOS:
Safari on iOS doesn't allow WebRTC disabling since iOS 12. Your only option is a VPN that routes WebRTC traffic through its tunnel.
Firefox on iOS uses WebKit under the hood (Apple requirement), so Firefox's normal WebRTC settings don't apply.
Antidetect Browsers:
Tools like AdsPower, Multilogin, and GoLogin offer WebRTC spoofing—they don't just block leaks, they feed websites fake IP information matching your proxy. Useful for multi-account management, not everyday browsing.
Understanding mDNS ICE Candidates
Modern browsers increasingly use mDNS (Multicast DNS) to protect local IP addresses.
Instead of revealing 192.168.1.105, the browser generates a random UUID like:
a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890.local
This UUID is only resolvable within your local network. Remote websites can't translate it to your actual local IP.
mDNS Limitations:
- Only protects local/private IP addresses
- Your public IP still gets exposed through STUN
- mDNS names can still fingerprint you (count of candidates, timing patterns)
Chrome's mDNS Behavior:
Chrome generates mDNS candidates by default for sites without camera/microphone permission. Once you grant media permissions, real local IPs may be exposed.
Disable mDNS Exposure (Safari):
Safari Preferences → Advanced → Experimental Features → Uncheck "WebRTC mDNS ICE Candidates"
This prevents even mDNS hostnames from being shared.
Testing Your Protection—Complete Verification
After implementing fixes, verify they work across multiple test sites:
- browserleaks.com/webrtc - Most comprehensive test
- ipleak.net - Quick check with VPN detection
- diafygi.github.io/webrtc-ips - Minimal test page (good for automated testing)
What Success Looks Like:
- Only your VPN's IP address appears
- OR no IP addresses appear (WebRTC completely blocked)
- Local IPs show as mDNS hostnames (acceptable)
What Failure Looks Like:
- Your real ISP IP appears alongside VPN IP
- Your real ISP IP appears instead of VPN IP
- Multiple public IPs listed (dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 leak)
Automated Testing Script:
async function verifyWebRTCProtection() {
try {
const ips = await detectWebRTCLeak(); // Function from earlier
const publicIPs = ips.filter(ip =>
!ip.includes('.local') &&
!/^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)/.test(ip)
);
if (publicIPs.length === 0) {
console.log('✓ PROTECTED: No public IPs exposed');
return true;
}
console.log('✗ LEAK DETECTED:');
publicIPs.forEach(ip => console.log(` ${ip}`));
return false;
} catch (error) {
console.log('✓ PROTECTED: WebRTC blocked entirely');
return true;
}
}
Defense in Depth Strategy
No single method is foolproof. Browser updates can reset settings. Extensions can malfunction. VPNs can misconfigure.
Recommended Layer Stack:
- VPN with WebRTC protection - Primary defense
- Browser extension (WebRTC Leak Prevent or uBlock Origin) - Secondary defense
- Browser configuration (about:config or flags) - Tertiary defense
- Firewall rules - Network-level backstop
If one layer fails, others continue protecting you.
Regular Testing Schedule:
- After browser updates
- After VPN app updates
- After extension updates
- Monthly spot checks
Common Mistakes to Avoid
Mistake 1: Assuming VPN protection is automatic
Most VPNs don't handle WebRTC by default. Their desktop apps tunnel HTTP but miss UDP STUN requests. Always verify.
Mistake 2: Only protecting one browser
WebRTC leaks affect Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Edge, Opera, Brave—all of them. Protect every browser you use.
Mistake 3: Forgetting about browser profiles
Chrome profiles don't share extension settings. A work profile might be protected while your personal profile leaks.
Mistake 4: Ignoring IPv6
Many leak tests only check IPv4. If your VPN doesn't handle IPv6 properly, WebRTC can leak your IPv6 address while your IPv4 stays protected.
Mistake 5: Trusting "WebRTC disabled" claims
Some browsers claim WebRTC is disabled but leave partial functionality active. Always verify with an external test.
Content Security Policy Protection for Web Developers
If you're building a website and want to protect your users from third-party WebRTC abuse, implement CSP headers.
Basic CSP to Restrict WebRTC Connections:
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
content="connect-src 'self' https://yourdomain.com">
This restricts WebRTC connections to your domain only. Third-party scripts can't establish peer connections to external STUN servers.
Server-Side CSP Header:
Content-Security-Policy: connect-src 'self' https://your-stun-server.com wss://your-signaling-server.com
Limitations:
CSP doesn't block WebRTC entirely—it restricts where connections can be made. A determined attacker could still use your allowed endpoints.
Proxy Integration: Routing WebRTC Through Proxies
Standard HTTP/HTTPS proxies don't handle WebRTC's UDP traffic. But some configurations work.
TURN Servers as Proxy Replacement:
TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) servers can relay all WebRTC traffic. Combined with iceTransportPolicy: 'relay', your WebRTC connections route through the TURN server instead of exposing your IP.
const config = {
iceServers: [
{
urls: 'turn:your-turn-server.com:443?transport=tcp',
username: 'user',
credential: 'password'
}
],
iceTransportPolicy: 'relay'
};
Using port 443 with TCP transport helps bypass restrictive firewalls.
SOCKS5 Proxy Limitations:
WebRTC and SOCKS5 don't mix well. Chrome removed SOCKS5 support for WebRTC traffic. Firefox has limited support through network proxy settings, but UDP traffic (most WebRTC media) bypasses SOCKS entirely.
Residential Proxy Considerations:
If you're using residential proxies for web scraping or account management, WebRTC leaks can expose your real IP to detection systems. Antidetect browsers like Multilogin or GoLogin specifically address this by spoofing WebRTC responses to match your proxy IP.
Browser Fingerprinting and WebRTC
WebRTC leaks aren't just about IP exposure. The number of candidates, timing patterns, and local network configuration create a fingerprinting surface.
Fingerprinting Vectors:
- Number of network interfaces (WiFi, Ethernet, VPN adapters)
- mDNS hostname patterns
- ICE candidate gathering timing
- Media device enumeration
- Supported codecs and capabilities
Mitigation Beyond IP Protection:
Even with IP protection, consider:
- Limiting media device access (deny camera/mic permissions by default)
- Using privacy-focused browsers that randomize fingerprinting surfaces
- Tor Browser (blocks WebRTC entirely)
Automated Monitoring for WebRTC Leaks
For security-conscious organizations, implement automated leak monitoring.
Selenium/Playwright Test:
from playwright.sync_api import sync_playwright
def check_webrtc_leak(vpn_expected_ip):
with sync_playwright() as p:
browser = p.chromium.launch()
page = browser.new_page()
# Navigate to leak test
page.goto('https://browserleaks.com/webrtc')
# Wait for WebRTC detection
page.wait_for_selector('.webrtc-result')
# Extract detected IPs
detected_ips = page.evaluate('''
() => {
const results = document.querySelectorAll('.webrtc-ip');
return Array.from(results).map(el => el.textContent);
}
''')
browser.close()
# Check for leaks
for ip in detected_ips:
if ip != vpn_expected_ip and not ip.startswith('192.168.'):
print(f'LEAK DETECTED: {ip}')
return False
print('No leaks detected')
return True
# Run daily via cron
check_webrtc_leak('your-vpn-server-ip')
Integrate with CI/CD:
Add WebRTC leak checks to your deployment pipeline. If a browser configuration change introduces leaks, catch it before production.
The Technical Reality: Why WebRTC Leaks Persist
Browser vendors haven't fixed WebRTC leaks because they're not bugs—they're features.
WebRTC prioritizes connectivity over privacy. Its design goal is establishing connections even through restrictive NATs, corporate firewalls, and complex network topologies. This requires discovering all possible network paths, including your real IP.
The Trade-off:
- Disable WebRTC entirely: Break video calls, screen sharing, P2P file transfers
- Allow WebRTC with protections: Accept some fingerprinting risk
Future Improvements:
The IETF's mDNS ICE candidates draft aims to standardize local IP obfuscation. Browser vendors are slowly implementing it, but public IP exposure through STUN remains unsolved at the protocol level.
Until WebRTC 2.0 or a major protocol revision, users must implement their own protections.
Quick Reference: Protection Methods by Browser
| Browser | Best Method | Difficulty | WebRTC Functionality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Firefox | about:config | Easy | Preserved or Disabled |
| Chrome | Extension | Easy | Preserved |
| Brave | Settings | Easy | Preserved |
| Safari | Experimental Features | Easy | Preserved |
| Edge | Extension + Flag | Easy | Preserved |
| Opera | Settings | Easy | Preserved |
| Vivaldi | Settings | Easy | Preserved |
| Tor | Default protected | None | Disabled |
| Mobile (Android) | Firefox + about:config | Medium | Preserved |
| Mobile (iOS) | VPN only | Limited | Preserved |
Wrapping Up
WebRTC leaks expose your real IP address even when using a VPN. They happen because WebRTC's peer-to-peer design requires IP address exchange, and these requests bypass your encrypted tunnel.
The fix depends on your browser and threat model:
- Firefox users can disable WebRTC entirely via
about:config - Chrome users need extensions like WebRTC Leak Prevent
- Safari users benefit from permission-based protection plus experimental feature toggles
- All users should verify their VPN explicitly handles WebRTC traffic
For maximum protection, layer multiple defenses: VPN with WebRTC protection, browser extension, browser configuration, and firewall rules. Test regularly—browser updates can silently reset your settings.
WebRTC isn't going away. It powers legitimate features millions of people rely on daily. But until browsers implement better privacy defaults, WebRTC leaks remain a persistent threat.
Take control of your browser's WebRTC settings today, and close this privacy hole that most users don't even know exists.